Suchergebnisse

This dissertation includes six articles tied together by the overarching question of how changes in public opinion, economics and public policy co-evolve in mature democracies, with a focus on redistributive (in seven European democracies) and secessionist preferences (in Catalonia and Scotland). The theoretical inspiration derives from three sources: 1. the Macro Polity model by Erikson, MacKuen/Stimson, 2. the Thermostatic Responsiveness model by Soroka and Wlezien, and 3. the literature on representation gap models by Gilens, Elsaesser and others. The Macro Polity and Thermostatic Responsiveness models come with an optimistic undertone, emphasizing that public policies adapt to public opinion, producing the policy-opinion congruence that defines responsive government. The Representation Gap model, by contrast, is more pessimistic in highlighting that the preferences of low-income groups are generally worse represented in public policies than the preferences of middle-income and especially high-income groups. While there is evidence in favor of these models for the majoritarian political systems in the US, Canada and the UK, less is known about the validity of these models in proportional democracies of continental Europe. The contributions in this dissertation address this research gap by integrating the three models and combining nearly 500 surveys to study the evolution of European public opinion at the national and subnational level. ; Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus sechs Artikel. Sie beantworten diet übergreifenden Frage, wie sich Veränderungen in der öffentlichen Meinung, in der Wirtschaft und public policies in etablierten Demokratien gemeinsam entwickeln. Der Schwerpunkt die Arbeit liegt auf politischen Präferenzen für Umverteilung und Sezession (Katalonien und Schottland). Theoretisch speist sich die Arbeit aus drei Quellen und verbindet diese miteinander: 1. das Macro Polity-Modell von Erikson, MacKuen und Stimson, 2. dem dem Thermostatic Responsiveness-Modell von Soroka und Wlezien und 3. die Literaturstränge des Representation-Gap Modells von Gilens, Elsaesser und anderen. Die ersten beiden Stränge, das Macro Polity-Modell und Thermostatic Responsiveness weisen einen optimistischen Unterton auf. Sie stellen in den Vordergrund, dass sich Public Policies der öffentlichen Meinung anpasst. So werde die Kongruenz zwischen Politik und öffentlicher Meinung, die die responsive Regierung ausmacht, ständig reproduziert. Im Gegensatz dazu ist das das Representation-Gap Modell pessimistischer. Dieses Modell betont, dass die Präferenzen von Gruppen mit niedrigem Einkommen in der Politik seltener Beachtung finden und ihre Policy-Präferenzen im Allgemeinen seltener umgesetzt werden, als die Präferenzen von Gruppen mit mittlerem Einkommen und insbesondere hohem Einkommen. Es liegen bereits empirische Befunde für beide Modelle in den Mehrheitssystemen der USA, Kanada und Großbritannien vor; deren Gültigkeit in den Proporzdemokratien Kontinentaleuropas ist jedoch weniger gut erforscht. Die Beiträge in dieser Dissertation schließen diese Forschungslücke, indem sie die drei Modelle integrieren und fast 500 Umfragen kombinieren, um die Entwicklung der europäischen öffentlichen Meinung auf nationaler und subnationaler Ebene zu untersuchen.

AbstractUsing data from 177 surveys, this study examines the evolution of mass preferences in Catalonia from 1991 to 2018, measuring (a) territorial preferences and (b) the central tendency of public opinion in the left–right scale. Consistent with previous research, I find that the political centre in the left–right scale of a subnational public opinion moves in an orderly manner in reaction to economics and both national and subnational incumbents. In contrast, demands for decentralization or independence do not systematically react to economic and political stimuli. Additionally, I find that, more and more, rises in support for independence are correlated with left‐wing shifts in public opinion.

Si bien es casi un lugar común decir hoy que la solución al conñicto armado colombiano debe ser política y no militar, los análisis que resaltan la dinámica política del enfrentamiento no son muchos, y en cambio, los razonamientos estructurales para explicar la confrontación tienden a prevalecer. Esa tendencia a lo estructural no es mala ni buena per se; más bien, hace referencia a las condiciones en las que el conñicto surgió. Sin embargo, ese acento tiende a mostrar una visión parcial, si no está acompañado de un examen de los procesos y las interacciones de los actores que intervienen en las diferentes coyunturas, y de los cambios y realineamientos que usualmente les siguen. Además, ese énfasis en lo estructural, muy asociado con perspectivas materialistas o económicas, tiende precisamente a oscurecer las posibles salidas negociadas al conflicto, ya que sustentan demandas por transformaciones radicales que incluyen cambios drásticos en la distribución de la riqueza, en particular de activos representados en propiedad rural.

This article takes the Yellow Vests (YVs, Gilets Jaunes) movement as a case in point to study the mechanisms by which social media can enhance protest participation. Building on the literature on social media and protest behaviour, we study the association between different political experiences on social media and protest engagement. We rely on novel survey data from the project YELLOWPOL collected in France in 2019 during a period characterised by the mobilisation of the YVs. We find that individuals' experiences on social media play a role in connecting general social media use with their participation in protests. Specifically, we show that simply using social media cannot predict protest behaviour, but seeking content from the accounts of decision-makers and activists and using social media to express opinions contributes to protest participation. These findings enhance the understanding of the individual-level mechanisms linking social media use and protest behaviour in first-wave democracies, expanding existing knowledge on the use and consequences of Internet-mediated technology on political participation and political change.

Presidents should prefer to be positively remembered in history for improving their country's conditions, rather than to be hated for generations. Few, however, succeed. Why? The inquiry goes beyond historic accounts or mere intellectual curiosity; it is a key part of understanding presidential decision making. We answer this question using data from an expert survey on the Mexican Presidency, the first of its kind for Mexico. Problem-solving capacities and presidents' ability to change the existing institutions are the main determinants of success. Corruption is barely punished by experts. Negative remembrance in history is associated to authoritarianism and economic crises. Adapted from the source document.

Presidents should prefer to be positively remembered in history for improving their country's conditions, rather than to be hated for generations. Few, however, succeed. Why? The inquiry goes beyond historic accounts or mere intellectual curiosity; it is a key part of understanding presidential decision making. We answer this question using data from an expert survey on the Mexican Presidency, the first of its kind for Mexico. Problem-solving capacities and presidents' ability to change the existing institutions are the main determinants of success. Corruption is barely punished by experts. Negative remembrance in history is associated to authoritarianism and economic crises.

One of the main problems that developing countries face is the increasing presence of organized crime; a presence that, in many cases, has weakened the structure of the State. Some governments choose to combat these illegal organizations while others decide to either ignore them or collude with them. We would expect that, as it occurs with any other public policy, the governmental decisions to fight organized crime would greatly depend on the anticipated response of public opinion to this type of public policy. Unlike other determinants -- the economy, for instance -- few studies have been done on the effects of anti-crime policies on the assessment of presidents. Using data from the LAPOP 2010 survey for the case of Mexico, I study the impact of several dimensions of the public safety theme on presidential approval. I find that the assessment of public safety performance has an important impact on approval. On the other hand, I also find that public support for a specific approach to fighting crime, the quasi-direct effect generated by lack of safety, and the perception of public safety as the central problem, have a relatively lower -- but nonetheless meaningful -- impact on approval. It was somewhat surprising not to discover meaningful effects on approval from victims of crime or persons who fear insecurity. Adapted from the source document.